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Abstract. Value Added Tax (VAT) is a significant source of fiscal revenues in the EU. However, the VAT treatment of 
cross-border supplies enables large-scale tax frauds, such as the Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC), which takes 
each year billions of euros from Member States' public budgets. In 2016 a definitive VAT system was proposed by the 
European Commission to respond to the shortcomings of the current temporary system. This new system should reduce 
the possibilities of MTIC fraud for intra-community transactions through the collection of VAT by the supplier in the same 
way as for domestic transactions. The tax collection by the supplier would impact the administrative costs of the financial 
authorities. This paper contributes to the discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the newly suggested 
system. The analysis focuses on the study of the change in administrative costs and VAT revenues for individual Member 
States and across the EU. The results are that after implementing the definitive VAT system, total administrative costs of 
the Member States would increase at least by EUR 107 million, whereas total VAT revenues would rise by EUR 40 billion. 
This indicates the overall positive impact of the definitive VAT system for the EU. However, individual Member States 
would not benefit equally. The net exporters, whose intra-community supplies exceed the intra-community acquisitions, 
would spend more than others for the collection of VAT in connection with the international trade of goods. 
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The value added tax (VAT) is one of the main sources for financing public spending in the EU 
member states. Unfortunately, the collection of VAT is affected by missing trader intra-community 
frauds (MTIC frauds).  
According to Poniatowski et al. (2020), the value of VAT gap, which represents the volume of 
VAT evasion, including MTIC fraud, reached EUR 137 billion in 2019 in the whole EU. Fighting 
against VAT fraud, therefore, belongs to major priorities of EU’s tax policy (European 
Commission, 2010). In this connection, a draft amending the Council directive on common system 
of VAT (European Council, 2006) was filed in 2017 (European Commission, 2017). The purpose 
of the draft was the transformation of current VAT treatment applicable for intra-community 
supplies of goods between businesses (intra-community B2B supplies) to a new mechanism, so-
called definitive VAT system. The current regime was implemented in 1993 and was meant to be 
temporary. As the main disadvantages of the current system are considered, both predisposition 
to tax evasion and high demands on tax compliance of businesses while trading on the intra-
community level. 
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The key difference between the current and the definitive system lies in replacement of two 
mirror “taxable supplies” requiring mirror reporting involved in cross-border transactions. These 
two “mirror supplies” are intracommunity supply and intracommunity acquisition. They will be 
replaced by only one transaction - supply of goods within EU. This supply will be taxed by 
suppliers in their own countries by the VAT rate of the destination country. The collection of VAT 
on B2B cross-border supplies will be organized through so-called One Stop Shop. In practice, 
when doing business on the intra-community level, the invoice would include tax of the country of 
destination (where the goods are being delivered) while the supplier would pay the tax to the tax 
authority in his own country (European Commission, 2017a). Subsequently, local tax authorities 
would transfer collected VAT to tax authorities in destination countries. The system would be 
working similarly to Mini One Stop Shop that is already used for electronic, telecommunication 
and broadcast services provided to non-taxable persons and recently (since 1. July 2021) 
expanded to cross-border supplies of goods to non-taxable persons (B2C cross border supplies).  
According to European Commission (2015), the drafted definitive system would lead to a 
reduction of compliance duties of businesses. The study also shows that the definitive system 
reduces the MTIC frauds in the EU, which would result in higher VAT revenues for public budgets. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the benefit of the definitive system would not be equal in all EU 
Member states. The value of savings would be affected by the volume of MTIC frauds in each 
state. The higher the size of these frauds in the country is, the higher the amount of additional 
revenue should be expected.  
Negative consequences of the definitive system in terms of increased tax administration costs 
will most likely arise due to the additional transfer of collected VAT between financial authorities 
of different Member States (Lamensch, 2012). Like the additional VAT revenues, the change in 
the administrative costs would not be uniform in all engaged states. A relatively better position 
(decrease in administrative costs after implementing the definitive system) might be expected in 
Member States with higher B2B intra-community acquisitions of goods than B2B intra-community 
supplies as they will stop collecting the VAT from acquisitions and start collecting it from the 
intracommunity supplies. On the other hand, states with more B2B intra-community supplies than 
acquisitions would collect payments for other countries, and their administration costs would 
increase relatively more compared to the current system, where they levy VAT on intra-community 
acquisitions and not intracommunity supplies. 
Provided that there exists a positive relationship between additional VAT revenues achieved 
by the definitive system and the change in administrative costs compared to the current situation, 
the implementation of the new system would be reasonable and thus acceptable for all Member 
States. On the condition that additional tax revenue is higher than additional administration costs, 
the transition into a definitive system would be advantageous also to countries with a higher 
amount of intra-community acquisitions. 
This paper analyses impact of implementing the definitive VAT system on EU Member States 
through calculation of the change in administration costs, additional tax revenues and 
comparative analysis of these two factors. Firstly, we examine which of the Member States are 
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more supply- and acquisition-oriented (net exporters and importers). We only use the difference 
between B2B intracommunity supplies and acquisitions because we want to find out what the 
change in administrative costs will be. In the original system, the state had to collect VAT from 
B2B cross-border acquisitions, and in the new system, it will collect VAT from B2B intra-
community supplies. Therefore, if the supplies are higher, the state’s administrative costs will 
increase. If, on the contrary, the acquisitions are higher, his administrative costs will decrease. 
The goal is to calculate the amount of the change in administration costs incurred by individual 
countries while collecting VAT for other Member States in the definitive system. Secondly, the 
paper provides calculation of additional tax revenue for each Member State and examines 




2. Literature review 
 
The current system of VAT is based on the invoice-credit method and fractional payments. In 
such system, the supplier collects tax from the transaction while the purchaser has a right to 
deduct the tax paid. Therefore, the tax administrator collects the VAT gradually from all VAT 
payers inside the distribution chain (e.g. Schenk et al., 2015; Terra and Kajus, 2015). 
The described system has been impacted by temporary rules for cross-border transactions 
applicable since 1993, when customs borders between Member States were cancelled. Under 
this temporary system, the invoice for a B2B cross-border transaction does not include VAT 
(intracommunity supply is VAT exempt) as the tax is fully levied by a state of consumption on the 
B2B intracommunity acquisition of goods. At the same time, to fulfil the purposes of VAT and its 
neutrality, the state of origin enables the supplier to deduct VAT incurred on purchases related to 
the B2B intracommunity supply of goods, i.e. VAT exemption with credit is applicable on the B2B 
intracommunity supplies. 
The element of tax exemption likely increases VAT fraud opportunities. Fraudsters exploit the 
VAT exemption for B2B cross-border transactions to conduct MTIC frauds (European 
Commission, 2016). MTIC fraud mainly represents a situation when a taxpayer acquires goods 
from other Member State VAT free and supplies the goods locally afterwards. The fraud appears 
when the taxpayer (here called missing trader) vanishes, does not file the VAT return, becomes 
no-contact. This missing trader does not pay to the financial authorities the tax on the local supply 
of goods despite selling the goods, including VAT (Fedeli and Forte, 2011). The next member in 
the distribution chain – local purchaser – frequently does not know about the missing trader’s 
intent and therefore normally pays VAT in the price to the supplier and then applies for VAT 
deduction (Ainsworth, 2009). 
The definitive VAT system keeps the principle of fractional payments, which have the 
advantage of the so-called self-policing nature (Pomeranz, 2015). The tax administrator is 
permitted to check whether the purchasers’ claim on input VAT corresponds with VAT declared 
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by the supplier (Cnossen, 2010). Each VAT payer is motivated to get tax documents from the 
supplier to claim back VAT on input. Input VAT can only be claimed through the VAT return. In 
the definitive system, VAT on theB2B cross-border acquisition of goods is not paid by the buyer 
anymore. The tax from the acquisition of goods and the right to deduct it are not cumulated with 
one and the same VAT payer. Therefore, a VAT payer who becomes a missing trader that does 
not file the tax return, is not only avoiding paying the output tax from his local supply but also 
cannot claim back the input tax incurred in the price that he paid for the goods purchased from 
another member state. In other words, since VAT definitive system replaces the tax exemption 
on cross-border transactions, the purchaser acquires from other Member State taxed goods. 
Therefore, if he/she disappears without payment of output VAT on subsequent local supply, 
he/she must sacrifice input tax deduction (Amand, 2014). This should lead to the reduction of 
MTIC frauds in EU (European Commission, 2015). However, there may still be tax evasion if a 
supplier from another Member State does not pay the tax in his State (state of origin) and the 
buyer claims it back in his State (state of consumption). This may be the case, in particular, if 
information systems are not interconnected between Member States. 
The main advantage the definitive VAT system would be a significant reduction of MTIC fraud 
across the EU. However, some authors also point out several disadvantages of the definitive 
system. For example, VAT Expert Group (2016) criticizes administrative burdens of businesses 
and the possibility of making a mistake while selecting the correct VAT rate or while assigning the 
transport in a chain transaction with goods. Furthermore, the necessity of mutual payments 
between Member States is another setback. Zídková and Šťastná (2019) also notice potential 
deterioration in businesses cash flow due to including VAT in the price for cross-border supplies 
of goods and the obligation to remit this VAT to the financial authorities often before receiving the 
payment from the customer. At the same time, the authors point out the loss of financial 
authorities' control over cross-border transactions should the Intra-community sales list be 
canceled. De La Feria (2018) criticizes insufficient harmonization of tax bases in the present 
system, and Catarino and Moraes e Soares (2019) notice insufficient harmonization of tax rates. 
Nevertheless, all these disadvantages may be outweighed by increased Member States' tax 
revenues. European Commission (2017a) estimates an increase in VAT revenues across the EU 
of EUR 40 billion per year due to the implementation of the definitive VAT system. This estimate 
is based on the size of carousel frauds (EUR 50 billion per year) and on the estimate of 20% 
margins on intra-community supplies. The definitive system would lead to a revenue loss in value 
of EUR 10 billion instead of EUR 50 billion because missing traders would not pay VAT on output 
but also would not have a right to claim input VAT. The tax revenue lost in such a case would only 
be the VAT from their margin and not the VAT calculated from the total value of the goods as in 
the current system1. However, MTIC fraud is not the only form of VAT evasion. There are also 
other types of fraudulent behavior, e.g., hiding taxable revenues, intentional use of lower rates, 
                                                     
1 In the current system, the intracommunity supply of goods is VAT exempt, and the missing trader does not incur any 
input VAT when purchasing the goods cross-border. Therefore, non-filing the tax return doesn’t mean the loss of VAT 
deduction. 
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or avoiding the VAT registration (Tait, 1988, Keen and Smith, 2006). The implementation of the 
definitive VAT system would not solve these forms of VAT evasion. It is obvious that there would 
not be an equal benefit of the definitive system in all Member States because the additional tax 
revenues after its implementation would differ, inter alia, due to economy’s business structure and 
the volume of VAT evasion caused by the MTIC fraud in each country.  
Therefore, in our paper, we try to estimate potential additional VAT revenues for individual 
Member States in addition to calculating their change of administrative costs. The change in their 
administrative costs depends on the trade balance of that State with other Member States, as 
explained above. The increase in VAT revenues depends on the volume of carousel fraud present 
in that Member State. The result of the overall trade balance of the State with other Member 
States and MTIC fraud present in that State are not related in any way. However, they express 
the cost and benefit of the definitive system for each state. Therefore, we will analyze the position 
of each state in these two respects, and we are interested in whether the costs and benefits are 
correlated or whether some Member States incurred only costs whereas others only benefits.  
 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
This section shows data and explains methods used for the calculation of the definitive system’s 
impact on each Member State. Firstly, the data used for the estimation of additional VAT revenue 
and the change of administration expenses are presented. Secondly, the chapter describes 
correlation analysis applied to find a relationship between additional VAT revenues and the 
change of administration costs. 
 
 
3.1 Trade balances and their adjustments 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, data from Eurostat’s International trade in goods statistics 
(ITGS) were utilized. ITGS includes both intra-EU and outer-EU business transactions. The 
amounts of imported and exported goods per each state and year since 1988 are collected there 
(Eurostat, 2020a). We used only the data on exports and imports within the EU. In the terminology 
of VAT legislation, exports are called intra-community supplies, and imports are intra-community 
acquisitions.  
Data of import and export should be adjusted for the purposes of our calculation. It is 
necessary to remove cross-border transactions, which would be exempted or not taxed in the 
VAT definitive system. These transactions can be found in the Council directive on common 
system of VAT (European Council, 2006) – further referred as VAT Directive.  
Although the VAT Directive is not enforceable in Member States directly, every country is 
obliged to implement principles and the content of this Directive into its own legislation. Therefore, 
we assume that transactions formulated in the VAT Directive as non-taxable are treated so in all 
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Member States, and we removed them from the ITGS. To be precise, we focused on the phrase 
“Member States shall exempt” used by the Directive. In such cases, the goods are exempted 
across the EU and there are no doubts about taxing them. Oppositely, if the wording of the VAT 
Directive contains “Member States may exempt”, we concluded not to remove the goods from the 
statistics. The reason is that the exemption of such goods is voluntary, and not all states apply 
that.    
Based on article 132 of Directive, activities in the public interest are exempted. These activities 
include inter alia postal services, hospital and medical care, services of dental technicians, 
services of young people’s education or specific culture services. Further, article 136 also 
exempts the supply of goods utilized solely for all exempted activities in the article 132. In other 
words, Member States are obliged to exempt, for instance, medical supplies.   
Other exemptions are provided in article 148 of Directive, which focuses on the exemption of 
international transportation. Based on this article, the supply of goods for fueling, reparation, 
maintenance and provisioning of vessels used for selected purposes is exempted as the activities 
itself. The exemption is applicable by analogy for the supply of aircrafts, goods for its maintenance 
or their reparation.  
We utilized two types of nomenclature to distinguish between taxed and non-taxed supplies. 
Firstly, the Classification of Products by Activity (CPA) nomenclature divides supplies according 
to NACE2 activity, so one might distinguish supplies of medical care products for health care from 
supplies of medical care for wholesale. Secondly, the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) nomenclature was employed to search for supplies on the lower levels of codes. 
Both types of nomenclature show the data on a monthly basis in EUR currency. For the reason 
of clarity, we summarized outputs on an annual basis.   
 
 
3.2 Administration costs 
 
The difference in administration costs caused by the definitive VAT system can be quantified by 
cost of collection indicator. The cost of tax collection is annually calculated and reported by OECD 
(2020) and represents the value of administration costs incurred by the financial authorities per 
one unit of tax revenue (not only VAT but all taxes). The indicator is calculated as the ratio of 
annual costs of tax administration to net tax revenues collected during the respective year as 
follows. 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠−𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇
   [1] 
 
Equation [1] includes values in national currencies. To improve the comparability of results, 
VAT on imports is subtracted from total tax revenues in the denominator. Further, OECD (2020) 
                                                     
2 Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes 
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multiplies the fraction by 100. For the purposes of our analysis, multiplication by 100 is not done 
so that the result represents collection costs per one currency unit of revenue. 
Collection costs of tax administration can be useful for prediction of additional administration 
costs incurred in the definitive VAT system. Each state’s additional costs can be calculated as the 
collection tax administration costs of each State multiplied by the expected amount of additional 
VAT collected by this Member State for another Member States. We calculate the difference in 
the tax administration costs from the amount of intracommunity supplies exceeding 
intracommunity acquisitions, as explained earlier. The reason is that under the current system, 
each state collects the VAT from the intra-community acquisitions and not from the intra-
community supplies but in the definitive system, it will be exactly the opposite. To quantify the 
change in administration costs, we multiply the balance of intra-community supplies and 
acquisitions of each state by the average VAT rate in EU (used for simplification as explained in 
next section). Thus, we get the amount of VAT to be collected in addition to what was collected 
in the current system. These amounts are then multiplied by the tax administration collection costs 
of each State.  
Even though such method of quantification is not perfectly accurate, it helps to demonstrate 
the effect of the definitive VAT system’s implementation. The inaccuracy is caused by several 
factors. Firstly, we build the calculation on data of the current system where no payments between 
tax administrators take place (except of VAT collected from electronic, telecommunication and 
broadcast services). The process of payments might cause other additional costs that we are not 
able to predict. Secondly, tax administration costs reported by OECD (2020) are calculated per 
unit of overall tax revenue and not only VAT revenue. However, due to the lack of more precise 
data we use it for our calculation as an approximation of the costs of VAT collection. Furthermore, 
VAT collection costs are also influenced by other factors specific to VAT and different from other 
types of taxes, as for example the average length of the distribution chain in the economy or the 
use of a local reverse-charge mechanism.  
 
 
3.3 VAT rates on cross-border transactions 
 
To calculate additional costs incurred by definitive system, VAT rate is highly important as it 
serves for computation of additional payments collected and distributed to other Member States.  
In our analysis, we utilized the arithmetic average of standard VAT rates applied in all Member 
States in 2017 (European Commission, 2020). Rates from 2017 were used to correspond to other 
data in the analysis that are last available in that year (but as Table 1 shows, they have not 









Table 1. Standard VAT rates (source: European Commission, 2020) 
  2017 2018 2019 
Belgium 21 21 21 
Bulgaria 20 20 20 
Czech Republic  21 21 21 
Denmark 25 25 25 
Estonia 20 20 20 
Finland 24 24 24 
France 20 20 20 
Croatia 25 25 25 
Ireland 23 23 23 
Italy 22 22 22 
Cyprus 19 19 19 
Lithuania 21 21 21 
Latvia 21 21 21 
Luxemburg 17 17 17 
Hungary 27 27 27 
Malta 18 18 18 
Germany 19 19 19 
Netherlands  21 21 21 
Poland 23 23 23 
Portugal 23 23 23 
Austria 20 20 20 
Romania 19 19 19 
Greece 24 24 24 
Slovakia 20 20 20 
Slovenia 22 22 22 
United Kingdom  20 20 20 
Spain 21 21 21 
Sweden 25 25 25 
 
 
The average VAT rate used for our analysis was calculated at 21.519 %. We realize that the 
use of the average basic rate is a great simplification, but in our opinion, it is sufficient for the 
preliminary calculation that we want to provide in this paper. For more accurate results in potential 
further research, we would suggest calculating the average effective VAT rate individually for 
each state according to its trade structure and VAT rates (both standard and reduced). 
 
 
3.4 Estimation of MTIC fraud 
 
For the calculation of additional VAT revenues, it is important to estimate the size of MTIC fraud 
because additional VAT revenues will be realized through the elimination or at least reduction of 
this type of VAT evasion. The value of MTIC fraud might be calculated from the VAT gap. 
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VAT gap means the difference between theoretical VAT liability and real VAT revenue 
(European Commission, 2016a). One of the VAT gap’s components is MTIC fraud. Nonetheless, 
there are also other components, as for example, bankruptcy of businesses or mistakes in tax 
calculation. It is estimated that MTIC fraud represents approximately 36 % of the VAT gap in EU 
(European Commission, 2016a). The estimates are based only on data collected from a few 
countries. All Member States were asked to provide data on the share of MTIC fraud in their VAT 
gap. However, only nine countries were able to provide data in required detail. According to 
European Commission (2015), in some Member States the MTIC fraud is expected to be lower – 
approximately 20 %. A lower estimate also stems from the work of other authors (Borselli, 2015 
or Poniatowski et al., 2016). Some other authors provided a calculation of MTIC fraud on certain 
goods or between individual countries (Stiller and Heinemann, 2019 or Vaškovič et al., 2021) 
using the discrepancies in trade balances. Furthermore, Stiller and Heinemann (2021), based on 
the analysis of reporting discrepancies in trade balances between Member States estimated 
MTIC fraud on electronic devices in the whole EU. However, these estimates are not available for 
all goods and all States. Therefore, we used extrapolation and weighted average to estimate the 
overall share of MTIC fraud on VAT gap at 24 %. This percentage was further applied to VAT gap 
in each Member State estimated for 2017 in CASE (2019). The use of the average share of MTIC 
fraud in the VAT gap is a limitation that could only be overcome with more detailed data from 
individual Member States. However, these data are not publicly available.  
 
 
3.5 Correlation analysis 
 
The relationship between the change in administration costs and the value of MTIC frauds might 
be appraised by correlation analysis. From the analysis, we will find out whether the States that 
will incur relatively more tax administrative collection costs are also states with higher MTIC fraud 
and thus higher additional revenues. This will help us to find out if Member States will be motivated 
to implement a VAT definitive system, because changing the VAT treatment on cross-border 
supplies of goods will increase their administrative costs but will also reduce their MTIC fraud and 
these costs and benefits are in balance. To determine the tightness of the dependence of those 
two variables, we chose Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which can be expressed as 
 





, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = �𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦�,   [2] 
where the variables represent 
𝑛𝑛…𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 … 𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦 … 𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 
 
The Spearman’s correlation coefficient is a non-parametric method that utilizes the order of 
variables’ values. It is based on the calculation of statistical dependence between the rankings of 
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two variables. It assesses how well the relationship between two variables can be described using 
a monotonic function. The great advantage of this method lies in its broad applicability. It might 
be used for all types of linear or non-linear correlation and furthermore, there is no need for normal 
data distribution. Spearman’s correlation coefficient is mostly used for variables that are expected 
to be non-linear or without normal distribution (Corder, 2014). 
For the evaluation of correlation’s statistical significance, we used hypotheses about the 
correlation coefficient. Hypothesis 𝐻𝐻0 represents independence of between variables while 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻𝐻1 means dependence (Hindls, 2007). 
 
𝐻𝐻0 = 𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 = 0; 𝐻𝐻1 = 𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 ≠ 0   [3] 
 
Further, we calculated test criterion t, which was afterwards compared to a critical region on 
selected significance level 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊. 
𝑜𝑜 =  𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠
�1− 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠2





 represents quantile of t-test with 𝑛𝑛 − 2 degrees of freedom. We use a significance 
level α αof 5 % (i.e., 95% reliability), the critical value is given by the quantile 𝑜𝑜0,975 (25) =  2,060 
 
 
4. Findings and discussion 
 
This section provides our results and related discussion about the impact of the definitive VAT 
system on Member States. Firstly, trade balances of each Member State are calculated. 
Secondly, administration costs’ change and additional VAT revenues are estimated. Thirdly, the 
results of correlation analysis between the change of administration costs and additional VAT 
revenues are provided. 
 
 
4.1 Trade balances 
 
Trade balances were calculated as the values of net supplies of each Member State to other 
Member States. The trade balances were adjusted by items deducted as non-taxable according 
to Directive. These items were about 2% of the total intra-community supplies and acquisitions.  
Table 2 contains “net supplies” (analogy of net export or trade surplus) calculated for each 
Member State as the sum of intra-community acquisitions of goods from all other Member States 
subtracted from the total of intracommunity supplies of goods to all other Member States. In the 
last two columns, the countries are sorted by their net supplies in 2017 to get the overview of 
which State was the net biggest exporter (intra-community supplier) and which had the biggest 
imports (intra-community acquisitions) 
 




Table 2. Net supplies after adjustments (EUR million). 
Country  2019 2018 2017 2017 
Countries  
(sorted by their trade 
 surplus in 2017) 
Austria - 16,908 -16,525 -15,179 174,064 Netherlands 
Belgium 28,333 26,145 25,641 25,641 Belgium 
Bulgaria -1,401 -1,312 -1,834 21,888 Ireland 
Croatia -9,353 -8,340 -7,758 20,887 Germany 
Cyprus -3,560 -3,669 -3,469 18,510 Czech Republic 
Czech Republic 23,019 20,323 18,510 9,981 Poland 
Denmark -5,895 -7,106 -5,390 7,671 Hungary 
Estonia -2,317 -2,451 -2,390 3,474 Slovenia 
Finland -10,486 -10,373 -10,158 2,677 Slovakia 
France -116,548 -113,908 -113,055 -1,568 Malta 
Germany -1,515 10,572 20,887 -1,834 Bulgaria 
Greece -10,424 -10,325 -10,401 -1,995 Italy 
Hungary 9,549 7,724 7,671 -2,390 Estonia 
Ireland 31,284 26,431 21,888 -3,469 Cyprus 
Italy 3,203 1,327 -1,995 -3,602 Latvia 
Latvia -3,881 -3,582 -3,602 -4,668 Lithuania 
Lithuania -4,642 -4,808 -4,668 -5,390 Denmark 
Luxembourg -6,040 -6,777 -6,029 -5,546 Spain 
Malta -1,619 -2,050 -1,568 -6,029 Luxembourg 
Netherlands 181,915 184,964 174,064 -7,758 Croatia 
Poland 19,155 12,426 9,981 -10,158 Finland 
Portugal -14,004 -14,086 -13,771 -10,401 Greece 
Romania -12,284 -10,857 -10,491 -10,491 Romania 
Slovakia 311 2,173 2,677 -13,771 Portugal 
Slovenia 4,411 4,276 3,474 -15,179 Austria 
Spain -3,258 -5,983 -5,546 -18,670 Sweden 
Sweden -17,502 -17,975 -18,670 -113,055 France 
Note. Source: Eurostat (2020) and own calculation. 
 
A positive value of net supplies represents a higher number of intra-community supplies than 
intra-community acquisitions. In such a case, the Member State would, after the implementation 
of the definitive system, collect VAT from B2B intra-community supplies for other states, which 
will be higher than the VAT collected from B2B intra-community acquisitions in the current system. 
Therefore, States with the highest trade surplus as Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Germany and 
Czech Republic would incur more administrative costs caused by a definitive VAT system 
compared to the administrative cost that they are spending now. The impact of a definitive system 
would not be equal for all Member States, and countries with positive trade balances would have 
the worse administrative position. 
In the left part of Table 2, trade balances are calculated for three consecutive years (2017, 
2018, 2019) to ascertain the trend. Most of the countries remain at either negative or positive 
values, except for Italy and Germany. As for Germany, B2B intra-community supplies exceed 
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acquisitions in 2017 and 2018. In 2019, Germany reached higher intra-community acquisitions 
than supplies. In the case of Italy, there were higher intra-community acquisitions than supplies 
in 2017. For the next two years, intra-community supplies exceed acquisitions. 
From the last two columns, it can be observed that Intra-community supplies predominate in 
the case of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland as well as 
Slovakia and Slovenia. These states are expected to have a worse administrative position in the 
definitive VAT system since they would have a higher administrative burden caused by the 
additional collection of output VAT on intra-community supplies for another Member States.  
The greatest difference between intra-community supplies and acquisitions is in the 
Netherlands. In the long term, the Netherlands has higher intra-community supplies than 
acquisitions by approx. EUR 181 billion. Thus, it is expected that the Netherlands would encounter 
the highest increase of administration costs in the definitive VAT system. On the contrary, France 




4.2 Change in administration costs 
 
Based on the results above, we analyze which countries would incur higher administration costs 
in the definitive VAT system and which countries will, on the contrary, reduce their tax collection 
costs. Table 3 shows the estimates of the change in administrative costs for all Member States in 
2017. The second column displays the change in VAT collected by Member States under the 
definitive system calculated as net supplies multiplied by the average VAT rate. The third column 
shows tax collection costs per unit of revenue. Unfortunately, the data about the cost of collection 
are not available for Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. To estimate the change in tax administration 
costs in those three Member States, we calculated average tax collection costs amounting to 
0.0078 based on the values for all other 24 states.  
The fourth column displays the final estimation of the change in tax administration costs 
caused by the implementation of the definitive VAT system. The estimation is based on the 
change in the amount of administered VAT and actual tax collection costs in each state. It is 
necessary to remark that slightly higher costs should be expected since the definitive system 
would also require new operations (such as forwarding of payments among tax administrators). 
The highest benefit of VAT system’s transformation would experience France. France has the 
lowest net supplies in the EU connected to an above-average cost of collection (0.0090). 
Generally, if the state with negative net supplies also has a high value of collection costs, it would 
benefit even more. The reason is that the tax, which is now collected not efficiently by such a 








Table 3. Change in administration costs. 
Country 
VAT administered for other 
member states  
(EUR million) Cost of collection 
Change in administration 
costs 
(EUR million) 
Netherlands 37,456 0.0076 286 
Germany 4,495 0.0137 62 
Czech Republic 3,983 0.0132 53 
Belgium 5,518 0.0092 51 
Ireland 4,710 0.0055 26 
Poland 2,148 0.0078 17 
Hungary 1,651 0.0078 13 
Slovenia 748 0.0068 5 
Slovakia 576 0.0078 4 
Malta -337 0.0042 -1 
Estonia -514 0.0033 -2 
Italy -429 0.0084 -4 
Bulgaria -395 0.0100 -4 
Denmark -1,160 0.0052 -6 
Latvia -775 0.0081 -6 
Lithuania -1,004 0.0070 -7 
Cyprus -746 0.0105 -8 
Spain -1,194 0.0069 -8 
Luxembourg -1,297 0.0079 -10 
Croatia -1,669 0.0072 -12 
Sweden -4,018 0.0035 -14 
Finland -2,186 0.0065 -14 
Greece -2,238 0.0064 -14 
Romania -2,258 0.0080 -18 
Austria -3,266 0.0084 -27 
Portugal -2,963 0.0113 -33 
France -24,328 0.0090 -219 
Total   110 
Note. Source: OECD (2020) and own calculation. 
 
Highlighted countries in the table are expected to experience an increase in administrative 
costs after the implementation of the definitive VAT system. The greatest rise of administration 
costs would occur in the Netherlands, followed by Germany, the Czech Republic and Belgium. 
Collection costs play a significant role in determining the change in administration costs. The 
high value of collection costs causes an increase in the final effect, as can be seen in Table 3. 
This explains why the Czech Republic should expect more additional administration costs than 
Belgium and Ireland although their trade balances show that they will administer more VAT for 
other countries. 
As the results are calculated for all Member States, it is possible to estimate the final change 
in administration costs across the EU as EUR 110 million (sum of the last column totalling the 
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changes in all member states). This calculation is, however, not precise as we expect higher 
additional costs due to new operations and services, as, for example, cross-border payments’ 










Italy 33,629 8,071 
Germany 25,016 6,004 
France 12,030 2,887 
Greece 7,399 1,776 
Romania 6,413 1,539 
Poland 5,764 1,383 
Belgium 3,996 959 
Netherlands 2,744 659 
Austria 2,444 587 
Denmark 2,235 536 
Czech Republic 2,082 500 
Ireland 1,938 465 
Portugal 1,929 463 
Hungary 1,893 454 
Spain 1,806 433 
Slovakia 1,791 430 
Finland 1,622 389 
Lithuania 1,119 269 
Sweden 654 157 
Bulgaria 625 150 
Croatia 459 110 
Latvia 385 92 
Slovenia 128 31 
Estonia 122 29 
Luxembourg 23 6 
Cyprus 11 3 
Malta 13 3 
Total  28,385 
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4.3 Additional VAT revenues 
 
Additional revenue in the definitive VAT system would be caused by eliminating MTIC frauds. 
Thus, calculation of additional VAT revenue requires evaluation of MTIC frauds. Table 4 displays 
VAT gaps according to CASE (2019) for 2017 and our estimated value of MTIC frauds. As 
explained earlier, MTIC fraud is estimated based on Commission’s study (European Commission, 
2015) as 24 % of each Member State’s VAT gap.  
Results vary among all Member States. Based on our calculation, the highest savings are 
expected in Italy (EUR 8 billion). The lowest additional revenue would experience Cyprus and 
Malta (EUR 3 million). Total additional VAT revenues in the EU would be EUR 28 billion in 2017. 
 
4.4 Correlation analysis and overall impact on Member states 
 
The change of administration costs and potential VAT revenues that would result from the 
definitive VAT system should be compared to find out whether the definitive system is suitable for 
individual members and the European Union as such.  
From the point of view of individual States, their net proceeds from the new system can be 
calculated if we subtract the change in administrative costs from the additional VAT revenues 
(which are equal to the Member States’s size of MTIC fraud). From the last two columns of Table 
5, it can be concluded that the new system is beneficial for all countries because the resulting 
proceeds of the definitive system are positive. This results from the fact that the MTIC fraud (i.e., 
expected additional VAT revenue) is much higher than the expected change of tax administration 
costs. Best results are achieved by Italy, Germany and France, which get the highest proceeds 
from the new system. This is caused by the size and volume of MTIC fraud that is eliminated by 
the definitive system. On the other side of the spectrum, there are small countries as Malta, 
Cyprus or Luxemburg that will have the least benefit from the new system. 
Furthermore, we want to assess the fairness of the implementation of the system for the EU 
as a whole because the costs and benefits of the system are not distributed evenly as explained 
above. To get an answer, the correlation analysis between the change of the tax administration 
costs and the estimates of MTIC frauds, i.e., a potential increase in VAT revenues, was 
performed. Ranking of Member States for the correlation analysis are shown in the left part of 
Table 5 below. Both variables (change in administrative costs and value of MTIC frauds) were 
arranged from the highest to lowest value, and according to their position in a row, the variables 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦 are the positions of the States based on their values of the change of tax administrative 
cost and MTIC fraud.  
Spearman’s coefficient is further calculated according to equation 2 as: 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 = 1 −
6∗3,056
27 (272−1)
= − 0.0672   [5] 
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Since the value of Spearman’s coefficient approaches zero, variables are independent. 
Independence might be verified by test of hypothesis on correlation coefficient. If we substitute 
variables in Equation 4, we get test criterion 
 
𝑜𝑜 = − 0.0672
�1− (−0.0672)2
 √27 − 2 = − 0.3365  [6] 
 
 


















according to net 






Austria -27 587 25 9 16 256 Malta 4 
Belgium 51 959 4 7 -3 9 Cyprus 11 
Bulgaria -4 150 13 20 -7 49 Luxembourg 16 
Croatia -12 110 20 21 -1 1 Slovenia 26 
Cyprus -8 3 17 27 -10 100 Estonia 31 
Czech Republic 53 500 3 11 -8 64 Latvia 98 
Denmark -6 536 14 10 4 16 Croatia 122 
Estonia -2 29 11 24 -13 169 Bulgaria 154 
Finland -14 389 22 17 5 25 Sweden 171 
France -219 2,887 27 3 24 576 Lithuania 276 
Germany 62 6,004 2 2 0 0 Netherlands 373 
Greece -14 1,776 23 4 19 361 Finland 403 
Hungary 13 454 7 14 -7 49 Slovakia 426 
Ireland 26 465 5 12 -7 49 Ireland 439 
Italy -4 8,071 12 1 11 121 Hungary 441 
Latvia -6 92 15 22 -7 49 Spain 441 
Lithuania -7 269 16 18 -2 4 Czech Republic 447 
Luxembourg -10 6 19 25 -6 36 Portugal 496 
Malta -1 3 10 26 -16 256 Denmark 542 
Netherlands 286 659 1 8 -7 49 Austria 614 
Poland 17 1,383 6 6 0 0 Belgium 908 
Portugal -33 463 26 13 13 169 Poland 1366 
Romania -18 1,539 24 5 19 361 Romania 1557 
Slovakia 4 430 9 16 -7 49 Greece 1790 
Slovenia 5 31 8 23 -15 225 France 3106 
Spain -8 433 18 15 3 9 Germany 5942 
Sweden -14 157 21 19 2 4 Italy 8075 
Note. Source: CASE (2019), EY (2015), and own calculation. 
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For significance value of 5%, critical value is represented by quantile: 
 
𝑜𝑜0.975 (25) =  2.060   [7] 
 
Considering test criterion, |−0.3365 |  < 2.060 , we cannot reject hypothesis 𝐻𝐻0 that the two 
variables are independent. We can therefore conclude that the introduction of the definitive 
system is good for the EU as a whole, but there is no balance (correlation) between the costs and 
benefits of the system for individual Member States. Some states will invest more in the new 





Definitive VAT system primarily aims to reduce MTIC fraud, but it should be noted that this system 
also causes additional burdens and financial costs, especially for Member States, which are 
supply-oriented in the EU market. The reason is that VAT from B2B cross-border supply would 
be collected in the country of origin and then forwarded to the country of consumption. Member 
State from which the goods are delivered is responsible for the process of payment and 
forwarding the VAT on B2B intra-community supplies. That would cause additional administration 
costs for the financial authorities of that state (state of origin). In the current VAT system, Member 
States collect VAT on the B2B acquisition of goods from other Member States, while in the new 
system, they will collect VAT on the B2B supply of goods to other Member States. Therefore, 
administrative costs will increase in countries that are net exporters. 
Based on our analysis, it was ascertained that a higher additional administration burden might 
arise in the Netherlands, Germany, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Ireland, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia. These Member States would experience an increase in tax administration 
costs because their intra-community supplies exceed intra-community acquisitions. 
According to our calculations, the total increase in tax administration costs in all Member 
States together is expected to be approximately EUR 110 million (see Table 3). This value can 
be characterized as the lowest value possible generated by the definitive VAT system because 
costs of new processes and operations (inter alia, settlement of payments between Member 
States or control of refunds paid to businesses purchasing goods from other Member States) are 
not involved in our analysis.  
Additional VAT revenues that could be generated thanks to the VAT definitive system are 
equal to the value of eliminated MTIC frauds. Total additional VAT revenues across the EU are 
estimated as EUR 40 billion, according to European Commission (2017a). This calculation was 
based on the estimate of the VAT gap from another study of the Commission (European 
Commission, 2015). Since then, the VAT gap has decreased across the EU thanks to various 
measures fighting against VAT fraud (for example, reverse charge applied by many Member 
States on risk commodities). Therefore, potential additional VAT revenue would be nowadays 
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lower than in 2015, they would reach EUR 28 billion in 2017 (see Table 4) and would still be in 
billions of EUR in the year 2021. Additional revenues would certainly exceed the additional 
administrative costs that we calculated.  
It is clear from the net proceeds of the individual Member States (in Table 5) that not all 
countries would benefit to the same extent from the definitive system. Italy, France and Germany 
would gain the most. Malta, Cyprus and Luxemburg would have the least advantage from the 
system in absolute terms due to their small volume of MTIC fraud. 
If only these two factors are considered, the definitive VAT system would be advantageous for 
the European Union. Nonetheless, benefits for Member States are not balanced since there is no 
correlation between benefits (the additional VAT revenues) and costs (additional administration 
costs) incurred by them. To implement the definitive VAT system, a unanimous agreement of all 
Member States is necessary. Therefore, we would recommend some sort of compensation of 
additional administrative costs for the Member States with a worse administrative position. 
We also find it necessary to emphasize that there are also other aspects of the definitive VAT 
system that should be evaluated to be able to decide about its implementation. For instance, the 
change in cash-flow of businesses and their higher compliance costs on cross-border 
transactions could have a negative impact on cross-border trade in Single Market or increased 
compliance costs for business. 
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